deepe air—page 1 sept. 2, 1965

SAIGON—The use of airpower in the Viet Nam war will be slightly tempered in some cases to payv pave the way for Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge's program of social revolution in the countryside, according to reliable sources.

"You can carry a military program so that is will as create political hatreds," one reliable source indicated. "We could win the war, hold a referendum and lose that." (Source 1.).

(more).

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The adjustment of the employment of airpower, most of which is

American-piloted U. S. Navy, Marine or Air Force air fighter-bombers—

is considered necessary by American officials in the political field

to prevent possible advs adverse political repercussions among the

Vietnamese peasants in the countryside. In addition, the increased

number of American combat forces on the ground gives military commanders

the chance to follow-up airstrikes in on the ground in the "contested areas",

where previously only f slow-moving forward air controller aircraft

directed and appraised the marginament air operations. (Source 2).

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Observers here have predicted a full-scale clash between
the Lodge viewpoint, which is considered to be more sensitive
to the political repercussions of the airstrikes, and the viewpoint
of American military commanders who considered airpower as a
primarily means of interior crushing the Viet Cong large-scale
offensives, problem of the large crushing the viet cong large-scale
offensives, and the rebruary before the arrival of
American ground units.

The Lodge viewpoint, succintly expounded by his top side

Edward G. Lansdale, a retired U. S. All Force general,

when he wrote that the Communists hav had set loose a revolutionary

idea in Vietnam that would not be destroyed by bombs or bullets.

While this statement reportedly inked Pentagon officials,

reliable sources here indicate that "there is no conflict bet t

between the Lansdale a viewpoint and the military viewpoint

yet." (Source 1).

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The employment of airpower within South Vietnam falls into
three broad categories. The first, called "mass air attacks," mostly
by Strategic Air Command B-52 bombers, pound stronghold areas of
hard-core Viet Cong concentrations. This program will be continued
and interfied accelerated to almost one are massive airstrike
a day, according to reliable military sources. (Source 2). The second
category of air employment is called close tactical air support which
comes to the aid of trapped and encircled Vietnamese and American
ground troops. Military sources but say this has turned the tide
of another battles in favor of the government and has prevented
the annhiliation of some government units, especially before the
arrival of American combat units.

"combat sorties" of fighter-bombers who fit which Viet Cong structures and troop concentrations—but unlike, the first category—the st airstrikes are not solely in Viet Cong stronghold areas.

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Rarely do ground troops follow up the "combat sorties" to determine exactly what structures have been hit and who have be who has been killed or in wounded, because or the eirstance; statistics are based mostly on pilot's estimates and not by confirmed evidence on the ground.

These missions are extracted exceptionally more difficult than strikes against the "death zone" are strongly Viet Cong manimumaraxamaxx stronghold areas, which contain the sparsest of civilian population, except for the members of the Viet Cong families. The "combat sorties" are launched against small Viet Cong guerrilla bands, who edd easily and readily mingle with the civilian population.

The problems of the "combat sorties" mirror the most pressing

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The Vietnamese government controls only a small fringe of villages surrounding each of the major population centers in the country; the remaining villages in the countryside are considered by counter-insurgency experts to be either partially or totally dominated or controlled by the Viet Cong—not only with guerrilla troop strength, but also by Communist political cadre.

## The sour

Reliable sources who have escaped from the Viet Cong-dominated hamlets said that the Communist political cadre, sometimes working underground, organized all the peasants—including women, children, and elders—into Communist associations, intelligence nets or liaison teams. In some cases, he explained, some small children act as guards and check the Communist credentials of other villagers.

Hence, to bomb the Viet Cong-dominated villages, which have in some cases been outside of the government control for two years when the strategic hamlet program collapsed, means to bomb both the Viet Cong actuals military eat and political activists as well as the pro-Communist sympathizers among the population, these species indicated. (Source 3).

"The basic problem on our side is that we have not yet found the answer for guerrillas in small groups," one reliable source explained.

"We have not yet found the answer to the Communist political cadre and the one-man terrorist. We will find the answer, but we have not yet." (Source 1.)

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On the mass air attacks by B-52 bombers in the Viet Cong strongholds, one reliable source explained, "it is an achievment if we can keep the Viet Cong from becoming a regular army, or if we can hit them when they get in large groups, or if we can keep them from getting together in large groups." (Source 1).

One reliable military source indicated that the increasing number of intelligence of reports indicated that the increasing number of the increasin

"This will cause the Viet Cong alot of problems," one reliable source indicated. "But it will cause us alot of problems too."