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concern 1 (normass/deepe)

SAIGON, DECEMBER 19—A deep sense of concern and uncertainty, mixed with anguish and some asser—is desirable and increasing within Vietnamese political and governmental circles about future American policy.

the visible drop in confidence in a American stick-to-itiveness at the conference table in Paris—especially after Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford's latest public rebuke at the Saigon government—is also creating a rather significant erosion of Vietnamese anti-Communist morale and confidence in their own government.

The uncertainties arising from the imax crescendo of criticisms from Washington officials about the Saigon government is giving rise to fresh batch of coup d'etat rumors, and some prominent Vietnamese nationalist politicians are known to be gambling that the American policymakers are man about to dump the g elected government of President Nguyen Van Thiou. Some have been saying this for months—and may be over-interpreting Mr. Clifford's criticisms of the Saigon government—but it is producing a politically disquieting effect.

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concern 2 (normass/deepe)

These un-settling, if not nerve-wracking, public remarks from Washington-which are also raising the disgust of members of the American community here, including some doves rather cool to the Saigon government-also are being made during a most jittery period when many Vietnamese and American officials think "almost anything can happen." The American military command has been calling on and off alerts throughout the country, expecting a major Communist big-unit offensiveor to be prepared for it in case the Communists attempt it. However, others are more frightened at the prospect of a major terrorism and sniper campaign in the cities, and while this would not repeat not necessarily involve a large number of Communist military units, it could have a still have a devastating effect psychologically, perhaps rasig raising major damages creating major damages to other urban sectors. Shimmymmeting a rising tide of criticism against the Thieu government, believe that the left-leftish-orit oriented nationalist political and religious leaders may begin a

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concern 3 (normass/deepe)

The week before Christa Christman Christmas is chock-ful of Vietnamese Communist holidays abd and anniversaries, and many nationalists traditionally feel that Communists will attempt to celebrate these occasions with spectau spectu spectacular displays of violence in government-held areas. The most important anniversary of these anniversaries is dates is the eighth eighth anniversary of the founding of the Communist-led National Liberation Front of on December 20ty 20th and the Communists have been calling for a their biggest celec celebration to date.

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The concern about the lame-do duck foreign policy of the outgoing

Johnson Administration is that Washington in the remaining month

before the Presidential Inauguration will make some major, irreversible

last-minute concessions to the Communists at the conference table

in Paris, which would erase significant battlefield gains made in the

last few months. Vietnamese politicians are deeply suspicious of

the Johnson Administration pushing events too rapidly in Paris—especially

in pressuring the Saigon government to be outmaneuvered by the insurgent

National Liberation Front. Vietnamese government circles discreetly

accused President Johnson of playing politics with the cessation of

the bombing of North Vietnam before the American election—and these

officials are now alleging that he is interested mainly in engraving

himself foresteding a favorable place in the history books.

Vietnamese sources were also especially ear inked that Mr. Clifford

played down the Communist violations of the supposed "understanding" about refraining from shelling Vietnamese cities and abusing the demilitarized sone-although these are reported almost daily by the American military command here. Rather than pressuring Hanol to abide by their agreements, the Saigon officials resented Clifford's remarks that the South Vietnamese delegation was holding up progress at the Paris peace talks and his statement that even if the Communists began a fourth offensive the Americans would still continue with the peace talks. While there may have been some merits in these his remarks, sources here criticize the "big stick" are approach

of Clifford and his t the tactical wid wisdom of his laying all his cards

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Vietnamese sources were also especially irked that Mr. Clifford played down the Communist violations of the supposed "understanding" about refraining from shelling Vietnamese cities and abusing the demilitarized zone. The American military command here regularly reports xx Communist violations or one sort sa or another. Rather than pressuring Hanoi to abide by their agreements, Washington is instead non pronouncing oriticizing Saigon-and even worse publicly- allogat alleging the of South Vietnamese government is holding up progress at the Paris peace talks. and Even worse, the South Vietnamese were horrified by Clifford's remark that even if the Communists launched another military offensive, the American officials would still continue to talk in Paris. While this statement was probably tause true, sources here criticise Clifford's tax wisdom in laying all his negotiating cards on the bargaining table and his "big stick" approach in publicly criticizing the Vietnamese. pleies unity- at the Land Ferrally And.

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concern 5 (normass/deepe)

Other Vietnamese anti-government—or "out "out "out" politicians—especially anti-government ones outside of the ruling circles—are also increasing their criticisms of the American policy here—because it is supportint the Thieu government. They are reportedly selling alfall sorts of ideas political "armchair ideas", plans for moving Thieu out of the Presidency and proposals for new governments, hoping to gain American support for future political action.

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"Even officials at the (Presidential) Palace, feel that they are caught," one informed source explained. "They don't k want to see the Americans (treeps (combat troops) go, and yet they k don't want to see more and more of their country ripped apart. Morale in the city is not repeat not as good as it should be and the government is not repeat not as strong as outsiders think. The population is both jittery and increasingly jeopardized by the high cost of living ordinary people simply can't make ends meet—and this in turn may start demoralizing the Vietnamese armed forces. If the words starts going around fast that the Americans are going to bug out fast, alot of people could start changing sides. There is alot of anti-Americanism now—not between the G. I's and the population, but by the se those who have been fighting this war formushating members are supplied to the Americans heard of Vietnam. Administration members are ministrated as a strong and the population of the Americans heard of Vietnam. Administration members are ministrated as a strong as a strong and the st

"The reason the Vietnamese politicians began rellying around Thieu in his showdown with Johnson last month was that it captured the latent anti-Americanism of many Vietnamese. He Now that is vanishing quickly. as it becomes clear the Americans are putting more and more pressure on the Saigon government. All in all, there's enough indices around pointing towards a catastrophe of some sort."