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peace l (normass/deepe)

(This is the /t last of a three-part series on the multi-facted war in South Vietnam, as Washington-Hanoi peace talks begin).

SAIGON, APRIL 12—Three different arrangements for bringing peace to South Vietnam are now being privately discussed in Vietnamese political circles here.

The three concepts have no repeat no official status in the eyes of either the Vietnamese and government nor the American mission here. Nor, is there any assurance any of them would be acceptable to the Communist perhaps slices the perhaps slices the side. Yet, they may be important as indication of future official

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concerned. This alone is significant, It is considered significant, however, that the Vietnamese political community here has begun discussing in some detail and coherency a sort of peace settlement for the South—which it never did before President Joy Johnson's April 1 (speech."

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"Saigon politicians used to pay lip service to negotiations before and some advocated it," one source explained. "But, they never truly thought the Americans would negotiate. They thought the American committment to the South was so great, their troops would never be withdrawn; they thought the American prestige was so tied to Vietnam, they would never stop fighting until they had won the war.

"So the government leaders and politicians thought they had all the time in h the world to line their pockets and fight among among themselves. But, President Johnson's speech pulled the political rug out from under them and gave them an abrupt awakening. Now they're starg starting to figure out peace proposals that will salvage as much of South Vietnam and the anti-Communist self-interest as possible."

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These political sources are quick to draw a clear line between of distinction between talking and negotiating. They view the Washington-Hanoi communications as indicating only preliminary talks about the related to the American bombing of the North. Whether this actually evolves into bargaining about peace in the South remains to be seen, they say.

The first peace proposal is voiced by Vietnamese politicians

who claim to discussed the matter with high-placed American officials

knowledgeable about developments on the peace front.

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The sources advocating this proposal detail it as follows: The Americans will give the Vietnamese anti-Communists "a last can chance" to prove themselves by stretching the peace time-frame to for years. During these four years, the Americans would regroup their forces in certain enclaves after the ceasefire; the Vietnamese government forces would continue to control their enclaves, and if possible expand them, and the Communists -- either Southern Viet Cong or North Vietnamese, since it is hard to distinguish the difference at long range -- would regroup in their base areas. The Next Northern troops would be regrouped in Souther base areas in the South, not sent back North as was the case in 1954. Whether the American and Communist troops would be phased-out of the country, during these four years demobilized, or disarmed would be a matter of discussion.

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On the political side, within the South, the Vietnamese government and the National Liberation Front would discuss together the formation of a new government within three years, and a an election in the South would be held/to ee approve that government. The result would probably be a coalition of some sort. but if the anti-Communists were successful in governing and gaining support of the population, they could gain the dominant voice. Then, this government in the South as well as the Communist government in the North would hold all-Vietnam Vietnam-wide elections to determine the unification of both halves. This would follow the pattern laid down by the Geneva Conference of 1954, but which was la later ignored.

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The second proposal, one of several "buffer" concepts, is being advocated b advocated by Sai those Vietnamese sophisticates from Saigon and the Mekong Delta. It probably would be rejected by all sides at a bergaining table, but it has some popular support in Saigon because it reflects a deep-felt interplay of Vietnamese regionalism. This interplay relates to three divisions of Vietnam-not the two regions of North and South shown on today's maps. These regions are called North, Central and Southern; the French followed this traditional Vietnamese division in their administrative system by carving out Tonkin (upper North Vietnam), Centra Annam (from the 18th parallel in the North half way southwards down to the top half of South Vietnam) and Cochinchina (slightly above Saigon southwards to the tip of the country).

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In this case the Chen Cochinchinese politicians would willingly give up the northern half the republic, convert it into a buffer which would form a neutralist government headed by the old Emperio Emperor Imperial faction, the radioel Enddhist leaders and their associated political compa. The North Vietnem would not be changed or discussed. Then the Cochin-china section, from Saigon south, would make their own arrangements with the National Liberation Front-the Southern leaders which is Southern-led and oriented, while the Northern political cadre would be regrouped elsewhere. Since the Southerners, even in the National Liberation Front, have been ruled by the Northerners and ACentral Vietnamese for so long, an all-Southern alliance could easily be worked out. The important economic factor here would be that the rice-rich Mekong Delta, long considered a chief objective of the Communist drive in the South, would remain in all-Southern hands, though of hues.

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This proposal does have enough circulation and currency in

Vietnam that informed sources say the anti-Communists living in Hue and
the upper sections other cities north of Sa gon fear the Che Cochinchinese
would do must that—and think they are going to be abandoned by the
to the Communists by their own government currency in Saigon.

The third proposal, another variation of the buffer concept, seems to have more chance of of being seriously considered. It is also voiced by Vietnamese who claim to have talked with the American officialdom.

In this case, one or two of the southernmost provinces of
North Vietnam, above the 17th parallel, plus the five northernmost
provinces south of the 17th parallel in the South would be formed to make
the buffer zone, which would be used one, as a regrouping areafor all
"fr "forein" troops—American, Korean, Australia Australian, as
and the Viet Cong.
well as the North Vietnamese. In this "neutral" area, the United Nations
would control the physical withdrawal of all these military forces,
back to their homes homelands, except for the Viet Cong. This
buffer zone would be governed by the pro-French netr neutralist
circle of the old Imperial family and the pro-Buddhist politicians.

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This buffer zone would also be open to visits from families on either side of the boundaries, north or south. North of this buffer would remain Communist for at least three years; south in the south, however, a transformation would take place. Within three years a new government would be formed south of the bufferline, based on a general election of all Vietn mese in the area. Then, to unify Vietnam after these three years, elections would be held in all three autonomous zones-j in the north, the buffer zone and the south, and what emounts to three separate countries at the time would somehow be amalgamated into one at the ballot box.