zczc sag yy ljp pacify 2 (normass/deepe)

To match the buildup of Communist forces along t in the I Corps area, the American command has been and is continuing to funnel in massive doc doses of ground U. S. ground troops and increased firepower. The five provinces now in contain nearly three American Marine Divisions, three U. S. Army divisions and two Vietnemese divisions, the American command has announced.

"The war here is now almost entirely relegated to the profession of arms," one American invovied in the involved in the pacification program explained. "It's difficult to make the American officials in Saigon understand this. They are still pushing us to go back into the countryside—without understanding the Communists regiments are asked hugging even the principal cities."

zczo sag yy ljp pacify 3 (normass/deepe)

provinces, / 114 or the 133 pacification of —or revolutionary development—teams has been accounted for. The Of the 114 accounted for, only 48 per cent were working in the villages assigned for to them for 1968. Roughly 23 per cent were temperarily assigned to other duties, such as distributing relief supplies and assisting city refugees, and the remaining 27 per cent were working in villages still working in villages assigned them has the 1967 pacification plan.

The cadre-teams in The and program in Thua Thien province, which suffered from three-weeks of all-out fighting in its chief city of Hue, seem to be worst affected as of the March 1 assessment; only 15 per cent of the cadre, averaging 40 men per team, were accounted for at the time.

zozo sag

yy ljp (normass/deepe)

"If you take there pacification program only on its measurable manifestations—number of tiam teams attacked, number of villages destroyed—it is not really a complete picture," the source explained.

"I would say on these two, our teams came out better than we expected. The damage to is going to be a big problem—the ess physical damage in cities, pot provincial capitals and villages—but it is not excessive, except for Hue. The real problem is going to be in the villages because the intensity of the war has been alot more disruptive."

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pacify 4 (normass/deepe)

you want to call it," one reliable source reported. "I look at pacification as much more a intangible than the number of teams—and the number of canals, schools and dispensaries they have constructed. The buildings are part and parcel of pacification—but the real point of pacification the program is what the villagers a feel, or their attitude towards their own government. That's what we're really taking about when we discuss pacification. And this is what our military strategy has failed to give us.

an intensification on the military side," he continued. "To pacify, the military m machine must give the people security—to live daily beginner without having to feel the wave of battle over and around them. This is where we've had a tremendous shellsoking.

yy ljp (normass/deepe)

The/military strategy is still to dead defeat the enemy and keep them away from the South Vietnamese population," the anti-Communist source explained. "Even along the demilitarized zone, this is still the aim of the American and Vietnamese military leaders—to keep the North Vietnamese Army from invading the South.

restill, there's a vacuum that initially can be filled by propaganda and psychological warfare—and then has to be build built up by military and civilian efforts. I wouldn't say the Tet offensive has struck an irrevocable blow to pacification—but we might as well face the fact the that, not purely militarily, but in the over-all sense, this is where we took it the Allies took it on the the chin. by the Communists incredible occasion coordination to attack as they did."

yy ljp pacify / (normass/deepe)

The removed knowledgeable source said that the Allied military effort during the initial phases cont of the offensive had fallen back to protecting the cities, which was a detriment to the defensive of the villages.

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(Henk: I think this is one of the most honest assessments by the one of the most honest, informed sources in the area.

Sorriest I unable to file earlier. The Khe Sanh airstrip
was closed for two days and I unable to get out until Saturday.

Khe Sany Sanh is at this time closed to women correspondents because another woman wounded there and lieuteant she talking with was gravely hurt. Hence, in the event something big does happen there—which I doubt—I hope John Hughes can plan to come in. I'll write long memo on this and other developments in several days.

or six articles, or 1000 to 1500 words each. This cover color, defenses, strategy and significance. I think for impact one must wir write the whole Khe Sanh piece as an inst integrated package, since so much has been written about it is separate facets. If you want, however, you can run the pieces separately and soissor up the series.

I'm fine and collected only skinned elbow swandiving into a trench during small artillery barrage. Will appreciate any guidance of what you want think were need to cover after Khe Sanh series; otherwise I'll plan to stay in Saigon for awahile, I'm also airmailing three or four

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