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declaration 1 (normass/deepe)

(This is the last of a three-part review of developments from the 1966 Honolulu Conference to the second / one held last week-end).

issued two and a half years ago, contained a four-pronged common committment between Research Ly Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Nguyen Van Thieu, representing the two Allied governments.

The second Honolulu Conference, just concluded by the two Presidents, has presumably reviewed progress made since then and clarified the differences between the two Allied objectives revealed in the original Declaration.

A significant significant difference between the two Allied governments appeared in contained on the crucial issue of peace in the 1966 Declaration, which contained three separate sections—the objectives of the American government, the objectives of the South Vietnamese government and the common commitments of the two governments.

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declaration 2 (normass/deepe)

The first common commitment was "defense or again agression." The South Vietnamese government defined this in the positive—"to defeat the Viet Cong and those illegally fighting with them on our soil." The Vietnam section did not explicitly explicitly commit its government to peace. The American government expressed this objective in negatively in simply "preventing aggression" and to "remain determined no path to peace shall be unexplored."

In short, the South Vietnam goal was victory; the stated American goal was the dual one of fighting while seeking to negotiate. However, American military commanders openly exuded optimism the war could be won; Vice President Hubert Humphrey in a visit to Vietnam following the first Honolulu Conference stated publicly the same conclusion.

The Paris peace talks illustrate an advancement towards this goal outlined two years ago—but no one at this time in Saigon is predicting whether South Vietnam is facing peace or more war.

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declaration 3 (normass/deepe)

The current military status in South Vietnam Is now from which

The Communist Tet offensive into the cities and its second were into Saiger constituted a partial offer strategic and tactical defeat for the Communists.

"Since Tet the Communists have recovered at some times in a local sense, but in a strategic sense they have not recovered from their heavy casualties," one knowledgeable source explained. Currently, Allied commanders predict the Communists are attempting a strategic recovery in order to launch another offensive.

psychological and political wicelyr victory, particularly in Washington and secondly in Saigon.

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declaration 4 (normass/deepe)

A second common objective was the "goal of self-government." The South Vietnemese government spelled this out as formulating a democratic constitution and creating an elected government. Despite internal disorders and charges of rigging the election, the Vietnamese government accomplished this with some measure of success on the surface. The legitimacy of the elected government is now the cornerstone of the political battle with the Communists, especially in negotiating a peace st settlement. The Vietnamese constitution outlaws Communism; the elected two-house legislature and President are considered here as so anti-Communist they currently serve as an official the brake on movement towards an internal accommodation with the Viet Cong-often discussed as an important part of a peace settlement.

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declaration 5 (normass/deepe)

THE NATION However, the formal process of casting ballots in an election last year, did not win the government the desired popular support. at Currently, while the Vietnamese government on the surface holds the legal foundations of power, the Communists are considered tunneling under its authority by attempting to spark a "general uprising." In the villages only several miles from Saigon, for example, the Communists are reportedly issuing ammunition and/or weapons to the peasants and the government's village chiefs have fled their offices for security in larger. more distant towns.

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declaration 6 (normass/deepe)

AlliED The other two common objectives are more difficult to assess: to work for a social revolution and to attack hunger, ignorance and disease. On the American dek side, an unprecedented effort was made in actions to help the Vietnamese government give its people normal services - such as education and public health-normally forgotten in the midst of a war. In one significant forward step, the Vietnamese government, with American aid, built enough schools and trained enough teachers to jump the number of primary age a children in school from 58 per cent to 72 per cent. The government is likely to meet its goal of 85 per cent of the primary school age children in classrooms by the end of 1969. In 1954, when South Vietnam was granted independence, only five per cent of the primary school age children where enrolled in school, official statistics But, the pivotal land reform program-which the American government show. committed itself to in the Declaration of Honolulu-made virtually no progress during the last two and a half years. Just now, the Victoriese government is again trying to disact its understrength administrative. resources to the this problem; American advisors to the program have been reduced in number. And since, the esci tion condition of the war in 1965, an estimated one out of every four Vietnamese has become a "refugee" isk of one sort or another at one time or enother.

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declaration 7 (normass/deepe)

One serious problem faced the h by the American aid program was the supplies moved through the Vietnamese government apparatus—the Americans were served as technicians, planners and logisticians, but not managers or doers. The Vietnamese government is itself was being proportionately weakened—more and more problems created by the war were thrust upon it at the same time the quantity and quality of its personnel were siphoned off to serve the Vietnamese army.

It also faced the problems of double subversion: Communist fifthcolumnists within its administration and corruption, in which bribes
and grafts to government officials negated the law of the land and the
democratic principle that all Vietnamese were equal before the law.

Now, two and half years later, the newly-appointed Cabinet of

Tran Van Huong has not major at made major strikes in coping
with the enormous problems of governing effectively. But, the major

Prime Minister has made the most important step of all—the first one—to
correct the injustics and abuses that have prevented or negated the

Vietnam's social revolution.

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