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MIGON, DECEMBER 6==Promillinship. Although Prosident Nguyen Van Thieu has office officially denied South Vietnam's several delections to Paris will "wait for President Nixon or anybody else," it the evidence here is that the short-term Saigon diplomatic strategy is to do just that.

Saigon newspapers genoral refel reflecting government thing one running banner headlines that it will be as long as six months beli bel before any vaguely significant substantive issues e meerning poace in the both are discussed at the conference table. Vietnamese political sources, including some joining the delogations going to Paris this week, privitely confide that the migon overnment is in no repeat no rush to decide any important questions until Nixon is in the mite House-and they hope-in rican Ambassador Averill Averell Harriman, considered here as "selling out Laos" in 1962, is replaced in Paris.

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Indicating Saigon's tough-bargaining attitude at Paris is one important and ironic concession that the Thieu government wrangled from the American officialdom before he agreed to end his month-long boycott of the peace talks. This concession for goes back to the final Palace sessions between the Vietnamese government and American Ambassador Ellsworth S. Bunker only hours before President Lyndon Johnson announced unilateriall his November 1st bombing halt of the North-and before Thieu told the Americans he would not send a delegation to Paris in early November. As a last-minute compremise in these final Palace confrontation, Vice President Matter h Nguyen Cao Ky proposed that Saigon would still send a delegation to Paris-but would first discuss only procedural questions, the implication being that the Victnamese government was not repeat no longer trusted the arrangements with Hanoi that Harriman was supposedly making on its behalf. In the pre-dawn hours, shortly before President Johnson's November 1 speech, the American officialdom here reportedly rejected this compromise, arguing these procedural discussions would take months and Washington was in a hurry. But, women later, in attempts to induce Sai on to go to Paris, the American officialdom backed down and agreed to this condition which it had earlier rejected--the net result being that Washington and Hanoi lost time in Paris, but Thieu gained, at least internally, in political prestige and won even more and clarifications from the Americans than he had previously asked for during the October sessions.

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Hence, while President Johnson wanted to launch immediately into substantive issues in Paris, some WP6 Vietnamese political sources sources close to the government are now predicting a battle over procedures in Paris that may take as long as three months—or more.

Another evidence of Saigon's hard-nosed attitude at Paris is the Constrates of Constrates of South's the behind-the-scenes role assigned to flamboyant) Vice President Network Ky who is the most prestigious and powerful leaders of South' Vietnam's have once have once have once to any peace negotiations short of accepting a Communist surrender,

and the fact that he is masterminding the Paris matters is a softening of his-and the government's-position to some extent. But, certainly he can be expected to veto making any important concessions to the H.D. The With sending of an elected Vice President to Europe will-Communists. JIETNAS ... the Saron government believes, perhaps erroneously-enhance Saigon's NET- O Isting prestige at the conference table, internally, it is evidence of a cler clever and calculated political move by President Thieu and the government.--for the right-wing faction, which looks to Ky for leadership and trusts his no-sell-out attitude with the Communists, can not be expected to he on the cause political distrubances disturbances in Saigon. Also, the right-wing d the political spectrum is now committed to peace nege negotiations of some sort, but and will have to bear responsibility fo of The talks for the outcoming, thus an eliminating their perogatives for disa dissetisfaction? dissetisfaction, in CASE A Compromise is Actually Reach

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Eventually--at some time--the expectation here is that the Americans and Hanoi will reach some bilateral agreement for a gradual exit of of some "foreign troops"--but probably not a total withdrawal by either side. But And thus, while the intensity of the war w may be scaled down, there is currently little hope that the Communist will accept Saigon's terms for peace and there is not repeat not a glimmer of evidence that Vice President Ky in Paris or President Thieu in Saigon will av accept anything close to the Communist terms of a coalition government in Saigon. Honce, thile the war may fade away somewhat, out of the international headlines, the hopes for any genuine peace for battered South Vietnam appear very dim indeed.

The official m Saigon delegation actually negotiating inside the conference hall numbers only five and his headed by a competent foreign affairs technician and for ier ex-ambassador to Manila, Pham Dang Lan. The delegation of Vice President Ky, who will operate outside the conference hall, Fride numbers x1 sixty eight person, persons, which includes a three-man brain trust (one full colonel, two civilians), one i two- twelve- an secretariat (including colonels, captains, typists, stenographers, speechwriters) and twenty seven service people (aide de camps, bodyguards, hairdresser for mrs. ky, cook for the whole delegation). Also a task force of more than twenty in modeling press and information specialists is also businessmen, Vietnamese journalists and other schedulod for Paris, ----unofficial citizens are a also scheduled for Paris. for the ove.

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